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Abstract—The scalability problem is a well-known problem
in blockchain implementation. Traditional solutions such as
sharding and side chain aim to solve this problem within one
blockchain system. On the other hand, some companies seek
to use interoperability for overall scalability. By learning from
these works, this study proposes a novelty inter-blockchain
communication framework that provides secure interoperability
for each blockchain. In this framework, cross-chain tasks need to
follow a workflow between the two systems. The result of these
tasks will peg to all other blockchains through the blockchain’s
terminated branch transferred in a gossip network. The workload
of anchoring is dynamically compressed and eventually achieved.
For a given rate of cross-chain tasks, our framework can
guarantee the number of message, which are directly related
to the task, will not change according to the scale of the system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain, the solution of achieving consensus in a de-
centralized system, has been adopted in fields such as finance
[Eyal 2017], supply chain [Abeyratne 2016], and crowdsourc-
ing [Li 2018]. Currently, blockchain technology can provide
two functions in a decentralized system. On the one hand, a
blockchain system can naturally work as a secure distributed
ledger [Ren 2018] for storing data redundantly and correctly.
On the other hand, a blockchain can provide a reliable, dis-
tributed calculating platform with the help of smart contracts
[Underwood 2016]. In a blockchain system, all nodes can
execute tasks consistently and offer robust services to all users
with the same quality.
Generally, the advantage of a decentralized system is its
robustness and trustworthiness compared to a centralized sys-
tem, considering crash and Byzantine faults [Lamport 1982].
However, a decentralized system must handle the problem of
scalability instead. As Figure 1 shows, scalability includes
two evaluation dimensions: performance and node scalability.
Performance usually refers to the throughput of a system,
which reflects the ability of handling services. In a standard
proof of work (PoW) scheme, the frequency of producing
one block is a fixed value that determines the difficulty
and security. As a result, the performance of the standard
PoW scheme relates to the maximum size of each block,
network bandwidth, and latency. On the other hand, node
scalability shows the number of nodes a system allows in
reality. In standard Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) protocols,
the communication cost is O(n2) for each round, where n is
the number of nodes. Hence, communication time in standard
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BFT protocols increases dramatically, as the scale growth that
cannot support the case requires more than one hundred nodes.
Figure 1: The scalability of Blockchain systems
[vukolic 2015].
However, if a system aims to improve performance and
scalability at the same time, consistency is difficult to achieve.
If one system achieves high throughput and node scalability at
the same time, the system must achieve consistency between
all nodes within a limited time. However, without enough time
to confirm different nodes, it is difficult for nodes to tolerate
Byzantine faults. In an asynchronous network, this require-
ment means that consistency strongly relies on a trustable
assumption. This property leads to many consensus algorithms
under different security settings [Karame 2016] and results in
plenty of solution trade-offs between scalability, throughput,
and security in the field of blockchain system design.
Side chain introduces an idea that shifts some payload of
the blockchain into a quick response off-chain network for fast
service [Back 2014]. The blockchain only confirms the final
result of these payloads. The design of a Hash Time Locked
Contract (HTLC) [Decker 2015] provides an implementation
of the lightning network into a cryptocurrency field, which im-
proves the performance of standard PoW protocols. However,
such improvement is tricky and annexes multiple transactions
in another environment before committing to the blockchain.
Although an HTLC provides a secure way to complete off-
chain transactions, it requires all users to take responsibility
and does not detect malicious behaviors.
Sharding tries to split payloads into several shards for
parallel processing and converge all final results into the
main chain’s block [Luu 2016]. Sharding’s idea is essential
because it supports consensuses in each independent shard
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and combines them to achieve overall consensus for the
whole blockchain system. However, this method also faces the
problem of Byzantine nodes that may collapse some shards to
affect the result of other shards. The mainstream methods use
a randomized setting that causes each sharding member to be
selected randomly, so limited Byzantine nodes have limited
opportunities to affect the consensus of the system.
A new direction for improving scalability is interoperability.
Interoperability allows for multiple blockchains to cooperate
even if they have different consensus rules and data structures
[Wegner 1996]. The value of interoperability is that it allows
for the different blockchains to provide services independently
and extend services with the help of other blockchains. Unlike
sharding, different blockchains can provide different services,
so each blockchain can be more independent compared to
sharding. However, with the help of interoperability, the
result of one blockchain system can be used to support
services on other systems, which allows for many systems
to provide services simultaneously. One typical use case of
interoperability is the sharing of health data [Gordon 2018]
[Azaria 2016][Vora 2018].
Interoperability also protects data privacy better compared
with other methods. [Williams 2020]. In this cross-chain sce-
nario, only trusted blockchain can access to all data of its
client and user need to grant permissions for all spread
of data by inter blockchain communications. However, the
loose connection between different blockchains also raise the
cost of communication and consensus. In next section, we
will introduce more prototype of cross-chain frameworks and
analysis their pros and cons.
This study tries to improve scalability through distributing
the payload into different blockchain systems and granting
interoperability to these systems. We will propose a framework
to handle inter-blockchain communications for blockchains
satisfies certain requirements. By considering the possible
crash or Byzantine faults of each blockchain, this work focuses
on providing secure interoperability between two blockchains
and detecting any forks that can affect the other systems.
Our main novelty are as follows:
• 1. To our best knowledge, we propose the first finality
based protocol for inter-blockchain communications that
can solves the delivery versus payment (DVP) problem
[BIS 2012] for cross-chain tasks.
• 2. To our best knowledge, we are the first team to
consider the possible corrupted blockchain system during
cross-chain tasks, and include the defense of these attack
vectors into our design.
• 3. To our best knowledge, we are the first team to use
a gossip network to detect attacks of a Byzantine fault
blockchain and limit the damage based on a predefined
rule.
• 4. To our best knowledge, we are the first team to
adopt a dynamically adjust mechanism to handle the
cost of making consensus about cross-chain tasks among
different blockchains so that we can reduce the burden
of synchrony different blockchains.
II. RELATED WORKS
This section introduces works that are critical to understand-
ing the problem and list their limitation when compared with
our product.
Elastico, proposed by Luu et al. [Luu 2016], and rapid
chain, introduced by Zamani et al. [Zamani 2018], are im-
plementations of a sharding blockchain system for improve
scalability. In these implementations, the randomness of each
shard limits the possibility of collusion and planned attacks.
Sharding shares some similarity with multiple blockchain
systems, in that they all split payloads among different shards.
However, the security of sharding largely relies on the ran-
domness of a shard’s creation. Different shards provide the
same service to all users, which makes high-cost cross-shard
communication frequent. In sharding, collusion in one shard
can affect the consistency of the whole system through the
main blockchain, which is a great threat to consistency and
security. Our framework splits the inter-blockchain services
and local services, so the attack on one blockchain will not
affect the result of another.
Chen et al. [Chen 2017] and Kan et al. [Kan 2018] have
studied communication between different blockchains by sim-
ulating Internet stack and TCP protocol to manage inter-
blockchain communication. Although these methods are use-
ful, they are not Byzantine fault-tolerant. The possible delivery
versus payment (DvP) problem between two blockchains could
be a barrier to adopting these protocols. Our framework mainly
focuses on the DvP problem that uses the property of the
blockchain to provide the terminality of all inter-blockchain
communication.
Tendermint, the consensus algorithm of Cosmos
[Buchman 2016], and Polkadot [Wood 2016] also provide
some attractive designs for blockchains’ interoperability.
Their products has been implemented in real markets
(https://tendermint.com/, https://polkadot.network/). These
works try to create a backbone blockchain whose validators
represent independent blockchains to record all inter-
blockchain communications. For better security, they all
introduce some nodes outside of the system to monitor the
behavior of the validators. Although their solution are quite
applicable in the real world, the issue remains of possible
attacks from one malicious blockchain that could break the
consistency of all other systems’ interoperability. Our work
limits the effect of one inter-blockchain communication and
adopts a gossip network to detect the attack and punish the
malicious system.
Borkowski et al. [Borkowski 2019] proposes a DeXTT
protocol for cross-chain token transferring. This work uses
a claim messages to register the proposal of cross-chain tasks
and use incentives to motivate validator reporting the hard
behavior. However, as the authors admitted in [Schulte 2019],
this work is lack of scalability due to the independence of each
cross-chain tasks. Our framework applies general design for
each blockchain. Instead of third part validator, our algorithm
connect the consensus algorithm of different blockchains to-
gether so the result of cross-chain tasks cannot be reversed.
Besides, instead of using time stamp, our framework adopt
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height as represent of time, which is more suitable in the world
of blockchain.
Another typical problem is how to build communications
between two blockchains. Hardjono et al. [Hardjono 2018]
investigate this topic and separate different designs into passive
mode, which only listen to one blockchain, and active mode,
where each blockchain can be a sender and receiver. One
important observation they have made is the active mode need
HTLC or similar mechanism to build trust. Hence, in our work,
we use finality and view of each blockchain to build a gossip
network. Based on the gossip network, each blockchain need
to implement a minimum API as described in Section IV.
Proposal A. like the work of Scheid et al. [Scheid 2019].
One innovation our framework has made is using a gos-
sip network to guarantee the security of cross-chain tasks.
Gossip algorithm is a simple, efficient, and robust that very
suitable for P2P communications. Works like [He 2019],
[Allombert 2019], and [Berendea 2020] already introduces
them into blockchain field. However, these works mainly
adopt this method as an improved protocol for intra-blockchain
communication. Our team find the potential of using gossip
algorithm in inter-blockchain communication and carefully
design the messages to protect the reliability of cross-chain
tasks.
III. PROBLEM CLARIFICATION
This section will clarify the problem model on which this
paper focuses and the benchmark used to evaluate our result.
A. Problem Notations
This section will clarify the notation used and the assump-
tions of this problem. First, N = 1, 2, ...N represents a
network of N blockchain systems, where system i has qi
nodes. Each system is a distributed network that maintains
a blockchain BC[] with all terminated blocks listed linearly
for consistency among its nodes. The position of a block in
the blockchain is called its height. The nodes of each system
run a consensus algorithm to provide their services to the
system’s users. A terminated block means at least r nodes
have confirmed and stored the block in their local copy of
BC[]. r is the parameter related to the system’s consensus
algorithm, it can be adjusted according to each system’s
consensus algorithm. (e.g. r = 23 in Practical Byzantine Fault
Tolerance(PBFT ) consensus algorithm).
Second, a block in each system’s blockchain contains at
least two parts: header and body. A block header contains at
least the hash of the previous block, metadata of the block
body, and signatures of its creator. For convenience, all block
bodies’ contents use the same unit—transaction to represent.
Hence, each system uses its blockchain to maintain the order
of transactions within the system as a service. If a block of
one system’s BC[] contains one transaction tx, transaction tx
is committed to the system.
Third, we assume that there is a request channel between
every two systems, which means for system A and system
B, at least rAqA nodes in the system A can send requests
and obtain responses from rBqB nodes of the system B. As
a result, system A can achieve a consensus about the state
of all systems with a limited error. This request channel is
essential for transporting messages between two blockchain
systems and can be the bottleneck of the whole framework.
The most naive way is using broadcast to achieve this and
more simplification will be introduced in Section V.
Finally, we split the job of a system into two parts. One
part is its local task that verifies and adds transactions to its
blockchain independent of other systems. The other part is a
cross-chain task, which requires verifying a particular trans-
action tx2 in another system’s blockchain before committing
tx1. Each system should work independently for its local task
at any time and support all legal cross-chain tasks through inter
blockchain communication protocol. There is no guarantee
that a system will not tamper with their record forever, which
indicates another system may undermine the security of cross-
chain tasks. Tampering with another system’s blockchain may
finally affect some local tasks that are related to some cross-
chain tasks. This kind of attack is an unavoidable risk accom-
panying interoperability. Any inter-blockchain communication
scheme should consider this risk and design the method to
reduce the possible damage caused by a malicious system and
protect the correctness of local and other unrelated cross-chain
tasks.
B. Problem Model
The problem can be denoted as following:
For any two system A and B in a given system net-
work N , system A can guarantee that for a transaction list
[tx1, tx1′, tx2, tx2′] either: system A only commits tx1 and
system B only commits tx2; or system A will commit both
tx1 and tx1′.
C. Benchmarks
We need to evaluate the performance of blockchains under
different parameters. We evaluate our scheme through two
aspects: 1. The cost of availability and 2. The cost of security.
We use the times of cross-chain communication required for
a cross-chain task to evaluate the cost of availability. Messages
using a request channel between two blockchains is the only
way in which cross-chain tasks differ from local tasks. The
use of this channel will affect the efficiency of each system.
Hence, the number of messages required for one cross-chain
task can represent the additional cost of cross-chain tasks as
well as the availability of our scheme.
The cost of security is another issue related to the gossip
network. The gossip network for detecting the forks of each
system is not necessary when all systems are reliable. How-
ever, if some systems are malicious, the gossip network can
detect the fork and protect the right of other systems. The
average message on the gossip network directly reflects the
cost of building such a gossip network. For different security
levels and scales, the change in such cost can reflect the
scalability for security guarantees. If nodes needs to send more
data in gossip network, the communication between different
blockchains will become more frequently so the attacks could
be easily checked, the whole system is more secure. On the
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contrary, if fewer messages are sent through gossip network,
one Byzantine blockchain could have higher possibility to
foolish other system.
After proposing our scheme, this work will first prove
that its setting can guarantee both the availability and the
security of cross-chain tasks. Then the experiments show the
growth of these cost under different setting, which indicates
the scalability of the system.
IV. PROPOSAL
A. Functions
This section introduces several functions used in our frame-
work. These functions are necessary and predefined by each
system as the foundation of our first contribution: Inter
Blockchain Communication Protocol(IBCP).
First, each node of system A will maintain a view list for
views of all other systems in the network that system A can
access. One view contains the information of another system’s
terminated blockchain current states, which is a recursively
calculated hash, and latest k terminated blocks’ hash as well
as sufficient proofs (e.g., rA signatures or threshold signature
from the system). A system can generate its view according
to Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 View generation
Input: Blockchain BC[], k
Output: view of the system
1: Result = []
2: m = length of BC[]
3: for i in [0,m-k] do
4: HeaderHash = Hash(BC[i].header)
5: Result[0] = Hash(Result[0]||HeaderHash)
6: end for
7: for i in [m-k,m-1] do
8: HeaderHash = Hash(BC[i].header)
9: Result.append(HeaderHash)
10: end for
11: return Result
A node needs to maintain a O(n ∗ (k+1)) hash value as a
local copy. This copy is cache of the whole network’s latest
status. Any two view lists can be connected if all views has
overlap some heights’ hashes. If A sends his view lists to B.
Then the view of C in A’s view list, denoted by VAC has the
power to update VBC if VAC [0] can be calculated from VBC .
This is because All view lists has backed by the message from
original blockchains and two different conflict view can be
connected by aggregating the hash of first element from the
oldest one till the newest. Hence, whenever a message that
contains view information is received, the node will use this
message to update their existed view list. So the view list will
be all messages broadcast within the gossip network, described
in part C, and pushes all systems to update their cache with
the newest view.
Second, each system should implement an APIs:
verify(tx) and check(hash). verify(tx) will inform
whether the tx can be added to the next block. In Bitcoin,
the input should be a subset of unspent transaction output
(UTXO), and the sum of inputs should be no less than
the sum of outputs. If a transaction tx satisfies these rules,
verify(tx) = true. check(Hash(tx)) returns the position
of one tx in BC[] of −1 if it is not existed. It will return
-1 when it does not exist. Formally speaking, for any
system i, if ∃hthattx ∈ BC[h], check(tx) = h; otherwise,
check(tx) = −1. Hence, the following properties hold:
• a. (Validity) For any blockchain with maximum height h,
if verify(tx) == True, check(Hash(tx)) == −1.
• b. (Agreement) For any system A, if check(Hash(tx)) >
0, tx can be accessed from at least rAqA nodes.
The check() function allows other systems to check the
existence of a tx. Each node has the responsibility to reply to
the request of check() from any sources. When a system sends
or replies a check() request, it will send the result attached
by its view.
Third, we define a contract trans-
action for system A where ctx1 =
Hash(tx1)||Hash(tx2)||Hash(tx1′)||Hash(tx2′)||B||h1||h2.
This contract represents tx1, the hooked transaction of the
contract, which is a cross-chain operation related to tx2
in system B, where Hash() is a hash function. The
expiration height for this condition transaction is h1 and
h2 in system A and B, respectively. The logic behind this
contract is as follows: tx1 and tx2 should be verified
before height h1 and h2 in the respective blockchain, and
if not, tx1′ will be added to this blockchain, which will
reverse the achieved result of tx1. Hence, we can easily
create a reverse contract transaction for system B as ctx2 ==
Hash(tx2)||Hash(tx1)||Hash(tx2′)||Hash(tx2′)||A||h2||h1.
verify(ctx1) = verify(tx1).
Fourth, we define tx→ tx′ represents tx is a precondition
of tx′ (e.g., ctx1 → tx1, tx1 → tx1′) within a blockchain.
Define a state called locked for a transaction. If tx is locked,
for any tx∗ that tx→ tx∗, verify(tx∗) == False. Each node
in a system should keep all committed contract transactions
before expiration, which are not yet expired, in the local wait-
ing list. The contracts in the waiting list are ordered according
to their expiration time. Whenever a contract transaction is in
the waiting list, its hooked transaction is locked. Such waiting
lists are used to check the validation of a process and timeout
process introduced later.
B. Inter-Blockchain Communication Protocol (IBCP)
The IBCP of a cross-chain task
for system A is as follows (ctx1 =
Hash(tx1)||Hash(tx2)||Hash(tx1′)||Hash(tx2′)||B||h1||h2):
• 1. Register: A user submits ctx1, tx1, tx1′ to at least one
node of the system A. Nodes check verify(ctx1). If it
returns true, system A commits ctx1 to the BC.
• 2. Check: Once a contract has been added, whenever a
new block is about to be created, the proposal will send
a request to system B for checking the states of their
contract. If system B did not commit ctx2, system A
will wait until system B sends check request for ctx1
and then resend its check for ctx2.
Page 4 of 11
• 3. Pre-commit: when system B committed ctx2, system
A will check verify(tx1). Then commit tx1 and lock it
as soon as possible and add ctx1 to the waiting list when
the tx1 is committed.
• 4. Terminate: After the height of the blockchain reaching
h1 and the view of system B reaching h2, the node
expires ctx1 from the waiting list. Then, the node re-
quests check(Hash(tx2)) and check(Hash(tx2′)) to
determine whether to commit tx1′ or not. If tx1′ needs
to be committed, a proof of system B’s hash state must
be used as a proof.
The success case of the workflow is shown in Figure 2. Since
Figure 2: Inter-Blockchain Communication Protocol.
cross-chain tasks are independent of the local task, such a
workflow may take for some time to wait for the result to be
verifiable. The timeout process is described in Algorithm 2.
Timeout is used to unlock tx1 and finish the contract.
Timeout will always be executed when both expired times are
reached. The correctness of this scheme is proven in the next
section.
C. Blockchain-wise Gossip Network
Until now, we have clarified the main steps of handling
cross-chain tasks and have a sense of the cost of availability.
But the IBCP are fully based on the reliability of blockchains.
This is the requirement of one blockchain but it cannot
be the assumption of a system of blockchains. Our second
Algorithm 2 Function of Timeout
Input: ctx; tx1′; hc (result of check(Hash(tx2))); hc′ (re-
sult of check(Hash(tx2′)))
Output: None
remove ctx1 from waiting list
h = check(Hash(tx1))
if h < 0 then
return
end if
if hc < 0 or hc > ctx[5] or hc′ > 0 then
release Lock of tx1
commit(tx1′) // attach proofs
return
end if
release Lock of tx1
contribution is the design of a gossip network to guarantee
the reliability of cross-chain tasks.
A
C
B
D
E
Request channel +
Gossip channel
Gossip
channels
Figure 3: The network structure of proposed framework
Fig 3 shows the network structure of different system. A -
E are blockchain systems within a gossip network for passing
gossip messages. A gossip channel between two systems can
be used to send requests like the channel between system A
and B. A system may connect to all other systems (like A, C,
and E) or just connect to a part of systems (B and D). The
gossip protocol will guarantee any information sent into the
system will be received by all systems eventually, if the system
is not isolated by Byzantine systems. Request channels that is
used for IBCP follows standard TCP protocols are build upon
gossip channels. Hence, once two systems want to implement
IBCP, they will be able to sent gossip messages.
Gossip network has push mode(sender select receiver), pull
mode(receiver select sender) or the mix. In our design, When
a node sends or receives a request that will update its view
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list, it will broadcast its latest view list to all systems through
the gossip network. This is the push mode. When a system
receives such a view update message, it will compare the
received view update lists to its local copy. If the local view
list needs to be updated, it will broadcast the newest view
again through the gossip network. However, this is not enough.
When blockchain A receives a view list from B, and the view
of C has reached h + k + 1(k is the parameter of Algorithm
1) while the local view list of A only contains the hash till
height h A cannot verify the correctness of message from B.
Hence, A need to use pull mode to ask C for giving a view
that longer than k + 1.
Theoretically, each view list should be a part of the union of
all view lists for the whole time line. Hence, if one node finds
a two conflict view lists, there must be some system lying
about view list. Hence, the node will broadcast the evidence
to all systems,(otherwise it cannot make consensus within its
system). The system with conflicting heights will be treated
as a system that has multiple branches. The network will only
admit one branch to inherit the identity of the original system
A depends on which branch has the cross-chain tasks.
From above design, we can find the speed of spreading
newest view is critical to the security of reliable blockchain
tasks, that is why IBCP keep the possibility of commit tx1′
until h1 and h2 are both reached, so the view list can be
generated and spread to other systems. If there are very little
cross-chain tasks, the latency of gossip network may still give
a chance to malicious system to create two branches with
different cross-chain tasks. Hence, the cost of security is based
on the number of messages flow in gossip network. To keep
minimum security, each system can set a pace maker to make
sure gossip network will not be idle for too long.
V. COMMUNICATION RULES
There are two kinds of communication channels between
systems. One is the requests channel, while the other one is
the gossip network. Assume the case in which one system A
sends a message Msg to another system B with a size of
nodes qA and qB .
The request channel is used for sending requests. The naive
way is a full connection between all nodes of the two systems.
That is, all nodes in system A need to send Msg to all nodes
in systems B until system B’s at least rB ∗qB nodes received a
rA∗qA identical copies of Msg for confirmation. This method
costs at least 2(rA ∗ rB ∗ qA ∗ qB) and at most 2(qA ∗ qB)
times node-to-node communications for one-time request and
response. As an improvement, sending a request does not
require that much confirmation. Hence, sending a request can
only cost (1 − rB) ∗ qB + 1 times to make sure at least one
honest node will receive the request. Additionally, sending
messages and receiving messages can be done by one node
in the system A because all messages can be verified through
signatures. For example, the selected node can be the creator of
the next block, the creator of the current block, or even a node
appointed by the user. This selected node can send requests to
the nodes in the system B and distribute the received results to
peers in system A. Hence, the minimum times of node-to-node
communications are qB + 1 and at most 2qB . Furthermore, if
the selected node in the system A is linked to the system B’s
all nodes or its links are not hijacked by crashed or Byzantine
nodes, the communication times can be further decreased. For
a given possibility p, a node only needs to see mB confirma-
tions without objection to believe that all honest nodes have
confirmed such a result. mB should satisfy (1− rB)mB < p.
Hence, mB >
ln(p)
ln(1−rB) is necessary for believing that such
a response is not forged. Thus, the minimum required result
can be decreased to (1− rB) ∗ qB + ln(p)ln(1−rB) +2, and we can
achieve one request to system B that needs O(qB) times of
TCP messages.
Fig 4 shows an example of this strategy. If the scale of
B increased, A needs to increase the number of requests to
make sure at lease one honest node will receive the request.
However, the required confirmations of responses can be a
fixed number according to A’s strategy.
A B
A B
Response= ln(p)/ln(1-r)+1=3
Requests = (1-r)q+1 
Figure 4: An example of Node to Node communication where
r = 23 , qA = qB = 6, and p = 0.01
A gossip network is another important part in the system.
A gossip network can transfer view update message to detect
forks before it can affect other systems through cross-chain
tasks. The performance of the gossip network affects the de-
sign of the view list. A gossip network is a relatively low-cost
network compared to a request network because the message
that goes through the gossip network has the lowest priority
compared to any other messages and asynchronous settings.
For the gossip network, each message is sending to a subset
of all systems. The maximum gap of a view’s height between
the received message and local view lists for any system in the
gossip network is set to k, which is used in Algorithm 1. k is
affected by the latency of gossip network and can determine
the size of the view update message. Once the gap of the
view’s height is above k, a node cannot verify whether the
received view list is correct, which means an inconsistency
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may occur in the network. The node that has the newest
views should immediately broadcast its view update message
to other systems. Upon receiving such a new view lists, the
node must communicate with the source system through the
request channel for missed views and verify them. Similarly,
systems can require the temporal leader of consensus to send
the view update messages to the gossip network. Furthermore,
view updates only need to happen when a new block is created
or when the new view list is broadcast within the system. The
reason is that view update messages are not required to be a
real-time message nor do they need a response. The chosen
leader only needs to send the messages to a limited number
of random nodes, while the intra-blockchain transportation of
these messages can be done at the same time as achieving
consensus. Hence, the cost of one time of sending a view
update message to system A through the gossip network is at
most (1− rA) ∗ qA+1 to make sure the system can broadcast
it within the intra-blockchain communication.
VI. ANALYSIS
This section provides the correctness and security proof of
our method.
A. Function Analysis
The function of this IBCP is to make sure the commitment
of tx1 and tx2 are related. The IBCP split this process into
two steps: first, commit and lock tx1 and tx2. Second, check
the commitment and, according to the result, decide whether
to commit tx1′ and tx2′.
Proposition 1: Assume that systems A and B need to
accomplish the contract that tx1 should be committed to A
and tx2 should be committed to B. A and B must commit
ctx1 and ctx2 before the expiration time.
Proof: If A directly commits tx1, nothing can guarantee
the B will commit tx2, so A should submit ctx1 first. If
A commits ctx1, B must commit ctx2. Otherwise, A will
never commit tx1 and reach the timeout. Thus, A and B must
commit ctx1 and ctx2 before the expiration time.
After committing ctx1, system A will send a check request to
B; B has not committed ctx2 and will wait until system B and
until B sends such a check request and then do check request
again. Hence, using three requests, system A and system B
can make sure they are all registering the contract to their
blockchain.
Proposition 2 (Einstein-Podolsky-Rosenberg): Assume that
systems A and B need to accomplish the contract that tx1
should be committed to A and tx2 should be committed to B.
A and B must commit tx1 and tx2 before the expiration time
and not commit tx1′ and tx2′ before the expiration time. If
A has committed tx1 and not committed tx1′, then B cannot
commit tx2′.
Proof: Committing tx1 and tx2 is obvious. Because
tx1 → tx1′ and tx2 → tx2′, A and B will also check the
existence of tx1′ and tx2′ in case the other system breaks the
contract due to some reasons. Hence, when both systems have
reached the expiration height, the content of ctx1 and ctx2
can be verified through the check() function. Without loss of
generality, assume that system A wants to commit tx1′ before
B commits tx2′. The committed ctx1 in BCA[] will require
the proof that B has not committed tx2′. If B has not reached
the expiration height, A can cancel the contract because B
will either not commit tx2 or commit tx2′ after tx2. If B has
reached the expiration height, and B did not commit tx2, A
can commit tx2. Otherwise, verify(tx1′) == False due to
the absence of a proof to commit it.
As a conclusion, this protocol guarantees the following con-
ditions. 1. ctx1 and ctx2 are committed to the respective
terminated blockchain before committing the hooked trans-
action. 2. tx1 and tx2, if committed, will be locked before
both blockchains reach the committing time. 3. After both
systems’ expiration time, the final result of the contract will be
determined, and the contract will be completed by removing
the lock of tx1 and tx2. If necessary, the commit of tx1′
and tx2′ claim the failure of this contract. 5. At most, 4
transactions will be committed to handling the contract: the
success case (e.g., ctx1, ctx2, tx1, and tx2) and the fail case
(e.g., ctx1, ctx2, tx1, and tx1′)
B. Security Analysis
This section provides some brief proofs of security for
security concerns. Since all cross-chain tasks are happened
between two blockchains, We assume there are two kinds of
attacker Adv1 and Adv2 and have different powers for system
A and system B.
• Adv1 has a full control of B, and these nodes could send
arbitrary messages as Adv1 wishes.
• Independently, Adv2 has a control of (1− rA)qA nodes
of A and full control of B (1− rB)qB nodes in B.
It is easy to find the no matter Adv1 or Adv2 can easily
to pursue A that it has committed tx2 at b1, and then use
b2 to replace b1 as a double spend attack. However, in our
framework, this is not the end of story, attacker must use
another cross-chain tasks on b2 to break the consistency of
the whole system. This section will try to prove this behavior
is impossible if all parameters of the system can be chosen
properly.
The first claim is Adv1 and Adv2 cannot deny B have more
than (1−rB)qB Byzantine nodes. This is important since only
the view of corrupted blockchain can be reversed by the whole
system.
Proposition 3: B cannot deny that it creates b1 to attack A
on purpose.
Proof: According to the communication rules described
in last section, A will send the request for check to more than
(1 − rB)qB nodes in B. Hence, at least one ”good node” in
B should not send the result of b1 to A when checking tx2
and tx2′. This means that more than (1− rB) ∗ qB nodes are
Byzantine nodes replies. Hence, B breaks its security claim,
so B attacks A on purpose.
This proposition shows the importance of confirmation from
nodes that a secure communication needs to receive enough
confirmation since all blockchains are mainly designed to be
BFT. If B reveals b2 to replace b1, all systems should be able
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to know that B is attacking A and refuse to make any cross-
chain task with B anymore to keep the consistency with A.
However, Adv2 can do something more compare to Adv1.
Since Adv2 also controls some nodes of A, it is reasonable
to assume A cannot send b1 to other systems. Under this
situation, we can prove:
Proposition 4: A cannot hide b2 before another system C
finish IBCP if the expiration time is long enough.
Proof: Since Adv2 may control the nodes of A whose
duty is sending gossip messages, and luckily no other cross-
chain tasks happened so other nodes in A will not notice the
VAB is different from other blockchain’s. However, when B
try to make another cross-chain tasks with C, B must reveals
branch b2 to C and C as well as other systems will receives
b2 and spread the view lists in the gossip network. So, honest
nodes in A will notice the conflicts between VAB and VCB .
A can spread the proof of b1 to all other systems to reject
any transaction on b2. Hence, as long as C maintain a long
expiration time, C will not finish IBCP before it notice the
Byzantine behavior of B.
This proposition shows how parameter of IBCP framework
related to the consistency of each system’s view list. The
two steps verification of IBCP also represents the consistency
checks through all systems to make sure all systems are
maintaining a consistent view list. However, we can find if
the attacker can isolate both A and C from gossip network,
the attacker may be able to break the consistency of view
list between A and C. This may be solved by a more active
gossip network like including a pacemaker for each system to
send messages. In general, we see the activity of the gossip
network is to keep the consistency of the whole system and
its simplicity and efficiency is a guarantee of all cross-chain
tasks.
Other than Byzantine players, there are some network
attacks like Sybil attacks and the Distributed Deny of Service
(DDOS) attacks among systems [Stephen 2018]. A Sybil
attack means that the attacker create several systems in the
model to arrange attacks. However, these bot systems need to
spend enough resources to convince users of other systems
for one round of attack. Hence, this attack is not profitable
if users can manage their risk. As for DDOS attacks, if one
system is attacked by DDOS, the system itself may stop work
for some time. However, such crash will not affect our IBCP
framework because either the other system will cancel the
cross-chain task or waiting for the recovery of the affected
system. The security of IBCP is not based on the liveness
of each system. Another risk is isolating one system such
as a Man in the Middle (MITM) attack to block gossips as
stated previously. This attack is very costly when the target
is a distributed network, which can also be solved by some
cryptography-based communications.
Finally, DDOS attacks are also worth considering. Attackers
can create many contracts to delay the process of achieving
consensus and increase the burden of both the gossip network
and the request channel. The solution can be charging an
additional fee for registering cross-chain tasks. Indeed, cross-
chain tasks require extra payment for stronger termination, and
complicated procedures are reasonable. The most significant
Parameter name value
block creating speed 0.1s/block
number of block 10,000
the scale of the system (n) 3/5/10
rate of cross-chain tasks for a block 10%/20%/40%
rate of sending a view update message to a system 10%/20%/30%
Table I: The parameter used in the simulation experiment.
problem is redundancy information spreading through the gos-
sip network, which is essential and costly. Hence, the gossip
network needs some rules for filtering received packages and
improving broadcast strategy. Systems can require a signature
for each message, limit the frequency of view update messages
for each system, or do these updates periodically.
VII. EVALUATION
This work intends to improve the scalability of one system
through the cross-chain operation. This section provides two
directions to evaluate this work. First we do a simulation
experiment based on python evaluated the average gap of
view lists to real cases and the maximum gossip and request
(check()) to different networks. Second, we will compare our
results with other solutions of interoperability to highlight pros
and cons.
A. Performance Simulation
The target of this work is to make sure two system either
make a success cross chain task or reject the transaction pairs.
Our experiment simulates the number of messages between
different systems within our IBCP framework and proof that
our system can achieve a good node scalability. To our best
knowledge, there has been no work trying to achieve same
goal in this form, we believe our work can provide a good
direction for the study of blockchain systems’ scalability. In
this experiment, we assume all systems create blocks with a
speed of 0.1 seconds per block, and each system will create
10,000 blocks. The setting parameter includes three digits: the
scale of the system (n), rate of cross-chain tasks for a block,
and rate of sending a view update message to a system. For
example, 3 1 1 represents a network with three nodes, and
10% of the blocks contain a contract transaction, while a view
update message will be sent to each node with a possibility of
10%. The gossip network is simulated by a broadcast channel
to follow the rule of the gossip algorithm. All parameters are
listed in Table I.
As previous analyses have shown, the function of our
framework relies on the request of the request channel. The
security of our work is based on messages of the gossip
network to control the gap of view. Hence, we evaluate the
effects of a change in parameters to evaluate scalability. With
a lower gap in view, the system will be more secure, while
fewer request and view update messages will reduce the cost
of this framework.
Figure 5 shows the result of sent requests that are related to
cross-chain tasks. Generally, one successful cross-chain task
requires at least four cross-chain requests. However, some
requests failed due to network latency. In our simulations,
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Figure 5: The graph of requests and gossips sent by a system,
comparing the change in scale, cross-chain task rate and rate
of sending a gossip.
more cross-chain tasks mean that more messages need to be
handled, which may lead to some delay or latency. Hence,
more messages will be resent to the target. However, due to
resending message more than one time, the burden of this
resending will only double the message that need to be sent,
which means the communication cost is at most 12 times that
of node-to-node communications.
As for the gossip network, the scale will cause a significant
change to the required view update messages number that is
growing faster than a linear function. The rate of cross-chain
tasks per block, which leads to more view updates messages,
only increases linearly. This result indicates that increasing
sending view update messages will not significantly affect
the volume of view update messages. Finally, increasing the
rate at which view update messages are sent will significantly
increase the volume of view update messages, which follow a
steeper linear relation compared to the cross-chain task rate.
Figure 6 reflects the distribution of gaps between view lists and
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Figure 6: A distribution of the gap of views for systems,
comparing the change of scale, cross-chain task rate and rate
of sending a gossip.
Solution Cost of availability Cost of security
Cosmos [Kwon 2019] 4 tx + hub commit + 2internal tx Hub Blockchain
Polkadot [Wood 2016]
Relay Chain commit +
2 internal txs + 1 proof
query
Relay Chain
DeXTT
[Borkowski 2019]
2 broadcast txs + 2 in-
ternal txs Veto process
This work 2 queries + 4 internaltxs Gossip network
Table II: The main design differences between selected solu-
tions
real cases. According to the result, we can find that the gap
decreased as the scale increased, which means the scale will
increase the transporting view update messages in the gossip
network. The more the network grows, the easier it will be for
the gossip network to synchronize all systems’ view lists. One
impressive result is the increase in cross-chain tasks results in
the expectation but also the variance of a gap decrease. The
reason is that each cross-chain task will broadcast more up-
to-date information than a forward-view update messages.
By comparing Figure 5 and Figure 6, we can find that even
when a small view update message is being sent (send rate is
less than 50%) for each system, the average gap of view can
be limited. This result is useful for determining k for view,
view list, and the length of expiration of the system. In the
simulation result, if a system increases the rate of sending view
update messages such as sending on average 1.2 systems each
time (sending rate is 30%), with less than one message per
ten blocks (5 1 3 case), the expected gap will be less than 3,
and k can be set to 5 for the worst case. If more cross-chain
tasks are required, k can be decreased further.
B. Comparasions
In this part we will compare our works with Cosmos,
Polkadot and DeXTT, all these three solutions implement an
interoperability to blockchains. We choose Cosmos and Polka-
dot since they are mature products for interoperability. Other
than them, we choose DeXTT as another try of decentralized
interoperability(no main blockchain).
Since different proposals have identical security assump-
tions, it is hard to say which solution is strictly better
than another. Hence, we will evaluate the cost of avail-
ability and security for the cross chain task mentioned in
Problem Model. The cost are evaluated as the number of
inter blockchain communications(communication cost) and
commits of blockchains(consensus cost). Table II list the
main differences between our 4 solutions. Lastly, we want to
compare the scalability of each system.
For Cost of availability, Cosmos and Polkadot use a main
chain (hub and Relay chain) to maintain the consensus be-
tween different systems. This choice is reasonable since they
are building ecosystem of their product. A main chain can
reduce the cost of making standard and governance. Cosmos
propose an Inter Blockchain Communication(IBC) protocol
to allow one system use two transactions to commit to hub
and the hub needs another two commits to the destination
system for proving. Polkadot use a more centralized way
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that commit all blocks of systems to the Relay chain as a
universal proof for systems. Polkadot allows different systems
making chain independently, the finality can only be confirmed
after the relay chain accept the commit. Polkadot is more
centralized compare to Cosmos in terms of finality. The usage
of a centralized main chain to keep consistency allows them to
spend shorter time(consensus making is faster than expiration
time) and less resources (main chain is always finalized) to
finish cross-chain task. As a decentralized solution for token
transfer, DeXTT broadcasts contest transaction and finalize
transaction to all other blockchains as an anchor for the task.
On the contrary, our framework use 4 internal transactions
and 2 queries, which is easier compare to inter blockchain
transactions, to link the cross-chain task to the finality of each
system. The difference design between this work and DeXTT
all use the idea of anchoring to other system, but obviously,
our systems gains more scalability since we don’t need to
broadcast the transactions to all systems.
In addition to the availability of cross-chain tasks, the
security of these tasks is also very important. For Polkadot
and Cosmos, they need to make sure sub-systems will not
reverse the result anchored in the main chain. Cosmos hub
and Polkadot Relay Chain all ask the node of the main
chain to check the security of each sub systems. In addition,
Polkadot introduce fisherman to hunt invalid behaviors for
economical incentives. These methods are practical but cen-
tralized method, cannot guarantee security if collutions within
main chain happened. DeXTT use a similar veto systems to
encourage other systems to report the double spending cross-
chain tasks and use incentives to motivate them. On the other
hand, our framework connect the cross-chain tasks with the
finality of each system and use a gossip network to combine
the consistency of each system together. The security of our
system completely rely on the gossip networks which also
provide the more flexibility to each system.
Lastly, we want to evaluate the scalability. DeXTT is not
design for scalability so its protocol will become very costly
once the number of systems increases, as a return, the security
will also increase because more system means more participant
for veto process. Polkadot and Cosmos’s scalability depends
on the consensus algorithm of the main chain. Tendermint
limit the scale of hubs. On the other hand, Polkadot seems
more efficient on building main chain (commit chains instead
of blocks) but also has the problem as scales goes up. Our
framework achieve a good scalability that the cost of cross-
chain tasks will not increase as the scale of system goes up.
As a drawback, a larger view list and extended expiration time
are needed for the same level of security.
In a conclusion, Compare to Polkadot, our work could be
slower but more decentralized. Cosmos is similar to Polkadot
but could be faster due the consensus algorithm, but our work
is decentralized and use fewer operations. DeXTT is also
a decentralized solution but our works use fewer operations
(broadcast to other systems is very heavy) and more secure
since the finality breaking is easier to be detected compare to
a veto process.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
This work proposes a framework for improving the scalabil-
ity of multi-blockchain systems through interoperability. Un-
der our framework, cross-chain tasks can create the externality
of each system and spread their security guarantees through
the gossip network. Any system that has finality and support
functions in section IV can use this framework to cooperate
with other systems. To our best knowledge, this is the first
work to combine the security of cross-chain task with finality
of all systems. Compare to some exited works, we successfully
use a decentralized architecture to implement interoperability
without loss of scalability or more security assumptions.
This work can be continued in many directions. First, view
list could be encoded properly to reduce the burden of gossip
network. Second, a more active fork detection method, like a
heartbeat, could further improve the security of cross-chain
tasks. Finally, There is a high possibility to simplify the
design of consensus algorithm under this framework due to
the externality.
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